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1 Introduction
According to a well known proposition in the literature on voluntary con-
tributions to a public goods1, small transfers of income (or wealth) among
active contributors to a public good will have no eects on the total amount
of the public good, and no eects on the welfare level of each participant.
We shall refer to this result as “the WKBBV neutrality theorem”2.The in-
tuition behind this neutrality result is as follows. Given the initial income
distribution, the Nash equilibrium contribution level of each participant is
determined. If initially there are q active participants, each contributing in
the initial Nash equilibrium a strictly positive fraction, but not the whole, of
his income to the public good, then any mean-preserving change in income
distribution among these participants will simply increase (or decrease) each
person’s contribution to the public good by an amount which is just equal to
his increase (or decrease) in income. Each individual’s consumption of private
goods will remain unchanged, and so will his total consumption of the public
good. It is easy to verify that this allocation satisﬁes the necessary conditions
of the (new) Nash equilibrium (with changes in individual contributions, but
no change in total contribution and in individual welfare).
The articles in the above literature share a common assumption: all the
players of the public-good contribution game are price-takers. That assump-
tion restricts the scope of application of the theory. In many real-world situa-
tions, some (or all) contributors to a public good are large enough to inﬂuence
prices. Large countries such as Japan, Germany, the USA etc., contribute to
many international public good projects. Surely these large players are not
price-takers. In this paper we show that if countries take into account the
eect of its public good production on the relative prices of private goods,
then the standard WKBBV neutrality theorem ceases to hold in our general
1See the articles by Warr (1983), Kemp (1984), Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986),
and the textbook exposition by Cornes and Sandler (1986).
2WKBBV is the acronym for Warr, Kemp, Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian.
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setting, unless some very restrictive assumptions are added. We also state
some additional assumptions that would restore the validity of the WKBBV
neutrality theorem.
In this paper we intentionally restrict the scope of our analysis in order
to focus on the non-neutrality issue, in particular, on the role of public good
supplies on relative prices of private goods. Because of this, we will refrain
from reporting in detail other important -but not closely related- contributions
to the theory of voluntary contribution to a public good. While our paper
deals with comparative statics in a general equilibrium model, we would like
to draw attention to papers on dynamic aspects of contribution to public
goods. This literature typically assumes that there is a growing stock of public
good that enters the utility function. Fershtman and Nitzan (1991) modelled
public good as a stock that grows with addtional contributions. They assumed
agents condition their additional contributions on the current level of the
stock of the public good. They showed that the free riding problem is worse,
compared with the case where agents are able to commit to a time path of
contributions. Wirl (1996) showed that if non-linear strategies are admitted,
then the outcome can be better than that predicted by Fershtman and Nitzan.
Itaya and Shimomura (2001) obtained results similar to that of Wirl, but in
a more general setting. Marx and Matthews (2000) introduced imperfect
information and focussed on Baysesian equilibria. In all these models, the
public good is a stock that grows over time. Benchekroun and Long (2005)
modelled the public good as a ﬂow, so that the only stock is the intangible
stock of cooperation (which does not exist in the models mentioned above).
2 The Model
2.1 Notations and assumptions
In our model, the players (the contributors to the public good) are not in-
dividuals, but are governments who care about the welfare of their country.
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There are q countries. Each country is inhabited by a continuum of identical
individuals, uniformly distributed over the unit interval [0> 1] = Each individual
in country l possesses Nl units of capital and Ol units of labor (measured in
e!ciency units). The population of each country is normalised to unity. All
individuals have identical preferences over three goods: two private goods,
called good D and good E and the third good which is a pure public good,
whose aggregate supply is denoted by J=(For example, J may represent the
world’s total scientiﬁc research output on global warming). Let jl denote
country l’s production of the public good, and J =
X
l
jl.
Let {ml denote the private consumption of good m (m = D>E) by the rep-
resentative individual in country l. The preference ordering of individual l is
represented by the “felicity” function3 ! :
Ul = !l(x({Dl > {El )> J)
where ! is increasing in the two arguments (x>J) and x({Dl > {El ) is the “util-
ity” derived from consuming the two private goods. We shall refer to xl =
x({Dl > {El ) as individual l’s utility level, and Ul as his felicity level. We make
the following assumptions:
Assumption 1: x(=) is homogeneous of degree one, twice dierentiable,
strictly quasi-concave, and strictly increasing in the consumption levels of
the two private goods. The felicity function !l is twice dierentiable and
increasing in x and J.
Remark 1: The assumption that “x(=) is homogeneous of degree one”
could be replaced by “ x(=) is homothetic” and our results remain essentially
unchanged. We assume homogeneity of degree 1 for x(=) only to lighten no-
tation.
Assumption 2: All three goods are produced under constant returns to
scale, using capital and labor as inputs. Production functions of the private
goods are twice dierentiable, strictly quasi-concave, and strictly increasing in
3We borrow the word “felicity” from Arrow and Kurz (1970, pages xviii and xx).
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both inputs. Good B is more capital intensive than good A. All countries have
identical technologies, and both private goods are produced in each country.
Remark 2: We do not specify at this stage whether the public good pro-
duction function exhibits the neoclassical technology (i.e., diminishing mar-
ginal rate of technical substitution between capital and labor), or exhibits the
Leontief technology (i.e., ﬁxed coe!cients).
Goods D and E are internationally traded goods, and the public good is
non-traded. Let D be the numeraire good. Let s, z, u denote the price of
good E, the wage rate, and the rental rate in terms of the numeraire good.
Let Fm(z> u) be the unit cost function of good m (m = D>E). Individuals and
ﬁrms take prices as given, and perfect competition prevails. We have (under
the assumption that ) the following price-equals-cost equations
1 = FD(z> u) (1)
s = FE(z> u) (2)
It well known that the unit cost functions are concave and homogeneous
of degree one in (z> u). We make the following assumptions on the unit cost
functions of the private goods:
Assumption 3: For any s A 0, the pair of equations (1) and (2) yields a
unique pair (z(s)> u(s)) A (0> 0).
It is well known that an increase in s (the relative price of the capital
intensive good) will raise the real rental rate and depress the real wage rate,
in terms of good D (also in terms of good E). Thus
u0(s) A 0 and z0(s) ? 0=
The cost of production of a unit of the public good is Fj(z> u). We consider
both the neoclassical case, and the Leontief case. In the Leontief case,
Fj(z> u) = zdO + udN
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where dO and dN are non-negative constants. In the neoclassical case, Fj(=)
displays continuous cross partial derivatives. Since z = z(s) and u = u(s)> it
is convenient to deﬁne (in both cases):
f(s) = Fj(z(s)> u(s))
Concerning the supply of the public good, it is convenient, though not
at all necessary, to suppose that it is done in the following manner. The
government of country l procures jl units of the public good from domestic
ﬁrms, at the price sJ which is equal to unit cost. Its total expenditure on
the public good is sJjl  Wl. To ﬁnance this expenditure, the government
imposes a lump sum tax Wl on the representative individual. (Recall that the
population of each country is normalised to unity.)
The (factor) income of the representative individual in country l is uNl +
zOl Since he is required to pay the lump sum tax Wl, his disposable income
is
|Gl = uNl + zOl  f(s)jl (3)
The consumer uses his disposable income to buy the two private goods so
as to maximize x({Dl > {El ) subject to the budget constraint {Dl +s{El = |Gl .This
yields his indirect utility function yl = y(s> |Gl ). Because of the assumed linear
homogeneity of x(=), the indirect utility function and the expenditure function
take the forms4
y(s> |Gl ) =
|Gl
h(s)
H(s> xl) = h(s)xl
where h(s) A 0 is the cost (in terms of good D) of achieving one unit of utility.
It is well known that the function h(s) is concave and increasing in the relative
price s of good E. Roy’s identity yields the Marshallian demand function for
good E :
{El = 
Cy
Cs
Cy
C|l
=

h0(s)
h(s)
¸
|Gl (4)
4See, for example, Varian (1992, p. 147).
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Remark: The elasticity of h(s), denoted by , is the budget share of good
E
 
sh0(s)
h(s)
=
s{El
|Gl
(5)
2.2 The two-stage game
We consider the following two-stage game. In the ﬁrst stage, each government
l announces (non-cooperatively, and independently of other governments) the
amount of public good jl that it will contribute to the world total provision
of the public good. It informs its citizens that they must pay a lump-sum tax
Wl to ﬁnance the procurement of jl.
In stage two, given the announced vector g (j1> j2>===> jq), the competitive
market solves the problem of allocation of factors of production in each coun-
try, and individuals decide how to allocate their disposable incomes between
the two private goods.
We shall solve this game backward. That is, for any given vector g an-
nounced in stage one, we must solve for the resulting equilibrium market price
s (and the associated equilibrium value of u, z, and utility levels that result
from the consumption of the two private goods). Everyone knows that the
outcome of stage 2 game is a function of the announced vector g. In stage
1, each government l announces the quantity jl. The objective of each gov-
ernment is to maximize the welfare level (i.e., fecility) of its representative
citizen.
3 Analysis of stage-2 equilibrium allocation
and prices
We have explained the consumer’s problem in section 2. We now turn to the
production side. Given s, the factor prices z and u are determined5 by the
5Throughout the paper, we maintain the assumption that each country produce both
private goods.
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equations (1) and (2). Using Shephard’s lemma, the amounts of capital and
labor required to produce one unit of the public good are, respectively
CFj
Cu
and
CFj
Cz
Thus, given jl, the remaning amounts of capital and labor in country l that
can be used for the production of private goods are
Kl = Nl  jlCF
j
Cu
and Ll = Ol  jlCF
j
Cz
Let I l(=) denote the production function for good l (l = D>E> j). Fol-
lowing standard analysis of competitive allocation using duality theory, we
deﬁne the private-goods revenue function for country l as the value function
of the following maximization problem. For any given jl and given s, the
competitive ﬁrms behave as if they collectively choose (NDl >NEl > ODl > OEl ) to
maximize the country’s total value of private-good outputs,
Ul = maxID(NDl > O
D
l ) + sI
E(NEl > O
E
l )
subject to
ODl + O
E
l + O
j
l  Ol
NDl +N
E
l +N
j
l  Nl
I j(Njl > O
j
l ) = j
l
The solution of this problem yields the private-good revenue function
Ul = U(s>Nl> Ol> jl)
As a consequence of the envelope theorem, the partial derivative of the
revenue function with respect to s is the output of good E, denoted by tEl :
CU(s>Nl> Ol> jl)
Cs
= IE(NEl > O
E
l )  t
E
l (6)
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On the other hand, the revenue from private goods production can also be
expressed as the sum of payments to factors of productions used in private
good production:
Ul = u(s)

Nl  jl
CFj
Cu
¸
+ z(s)

Ol  jl
CFj
Cz
¸
= u(s)Nl + z(s)Ol  jl

u
CFj
Cu
+ z
CFj
Cz
¸
= u(s)Nl + z(s)Ol  jlFj(z> u)
Thus
Ul = U(s>Nl> Ol> jl) = u(s)Nl + z(s)Ol  jlf(s)
and hence, recalling (6), the country’s output of good E is
tEl =
CU(s>Nl> Ol> jl)
Cs
= u0(s)Nl + z0(s)Ol  jlf0(s) (7)
It is a well known result that the revenue function is convex in the price
s. Thus
C2U(s>Nl> Ol> jl)
Cs2
= u00(s)N + z00(s)O jlf00(s)  0 (8)
This implies that, given jl, the output tEl is a non-decreasing function of its
price.
From (3), (4) and (7), country l’s excess demand for good E is
PEl  {
E
l  t
E
l
=

h0(s)
h(s)
¸
[uNl + zOl  f(s)jl] [u0(s)Nl + z0(s)Ol  jlf0(s)] (9)
Lemma 1: The world uncompensated excess demand for good E is a a
linear function of N>O and J for given s :
PE(s>N>O>J) =
h0(s)
h(s)
[u(s)N + z(s)O f(s)J][u0(s)N + z0(s)O f0(s)J]
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where
N =
qX
l=l
Nl> O =
qX
l=l
Ol> J =
qX
l=l
jl
Proof: Sum the equation (9) over all l.¥
Thus, the free trade equilibrium price s> denoted by bs, must satisfy the
condition
h0(bs) [u(bs)N + z(bs)O f(bs)J] h(bs) [u0(bs)N + z0(bs)O f0(bs)J] = 0 (10)
It follows that bs is a function of (J>N>O) and is independent of their distri-
butions.
Remark: The slope of the world excess demand curve for good E, eval-
uated at bs, is negative. To see this, note that
CPE
Cs
=
1
h(bs) {h00(bs) [u(bs)N + z(bs)O f(bs)J] + h0(bs) [u0(bs)N + z0(bs)O f0(bs)J]}


h0(bs)
h(bs)
¸2
[u(bs)N + z(bs)O f(bs)J]
 [u00(bs)N + z00(bs)O f00(bs)J]
By making use of (10), the above expression reduces to
CPE
Cs
=
1
h(bs) {h00(bs) [u(bs)N + z(bs)O f(bs)J] h(bs) [u00(bs)N + z00(bs)O f00(bs)J]}
(11)
The right-hand side of (11) is negative because (i) the expenditure function
is concave in price, and (ii) equation (8) holds. Note that CPE@Cs ? 0 is the
Walrasian stability condition.
Lemma 2: Given the assumption that all countries produce both goods,
the equilibrium world price of good E is a function of the sum of the Nl’s,
the sum of the Ol’s, and the sum of the jl’s.
bs = bs(N>O>J)
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In particular, (i) given J and O, any (small) redistribution of the Nl’s among
countries (keeping the totalN constant) will have no eects on the equilibrium
relative price bs, (ii) an increase in J will increase (decrease) the equilibrium
relative price bs if and only if the budget share of good E in the private goods
expenditure exceeds (falls short of) the elasticity of the unit cost of the public
good with respect to the price of good E.
Proof: Equation (10) deﬁnes an implicit function
bs = bs(N>O>J) (12)
Let
{  h00(bs) [u(bs)N + z(bs)O f(bs)J] h(bs) [u00(bs)N + z00(bs)O f00(bs)J] ? 0
Dierentiating (10) totally, we get
{gbs+ [h0(bs)u(bs) h(bs)u0(bs)] gN + [h0(bs)z(bs) h(bs)z0(bs)] gO
 [h0(bs)f(bs) h(bs)f0(bs)] gJ = 0 (13)
Therefore, using (13) and (5), we get
Cbs
CJ
=
[h0(bs)f(bs) h(bs)f0(bs)]
{
=
f(bs)bsh(bs){

 
bsf0(bs)
f(bs)
¸
(14)
¥
Thus each country knows that if it increases its contribution to the global
public good, the price of good E will fall if and only if the budget share of
good E in the private goods expenditure exceeds the elasticity of the unit
cost of the public good with respect to the price of good E.
Lemma 3: Let l denote the following vector of parameters
l  (N>O>J>Nl> Ol> jl)
Then, at the free trade equilibrium, the disposable income of country l’s
representative individual is
|Gl (l) = u(bs(N>O>J))Nl + z(bs(N>O>J))Ol  f(bs(N>O>J))jl (15)
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and his indirect utility is
xl = y(bs(N>O>J)> |Gl (l))= (16)
Lemma 4: If country l’s is a net importer of good E, an increase in bs
will reduce its utility by PEl @h(bs(N>O>J)).
Proof:
Dierentiating the equilibrium indirect utility xl = y(bs(N>O>J)> |Gl (l))
with respect to bs yields
gxl
gbs = ys + y| C|GlCbs
or
1
y|
gxl
gbs =

C|Gl
Cbs 
μ
ys
y|
¶¸
= tEl  {
E
l  P
E
l
wherePEl denotes country l’s import of good E. For later reference, we note
that
ys =
h0(bs)|Gl
h(bs(N>O>J))2 and y| = 1h(bs(N>O>J))
and
C|Gl
Cbs = Nlu0 + Olz0  jlf0
Thus
gxl
gbs =  1h(bs)
½
h0
h
[uNl + zOl  fjl] [Nlu0 + Olz0  jlf0]
¾
 
PEl
h(bs) (17)
where the term inside the curly brackets is country l’s import of good E,
being the dierence between consumption and production.¥
Remark: Keeping bs constant, if a country increases jl, its utility derived
from private goods will change by
Cxl
Cjl
= y|
C|Gl
Cjl
= 
f(bs)
h(bs) ? 0 (18)
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4 Analysis of Stage-1 Game
Now consider stage 1. The government of country l knows the indirect utility
function xl = y(bs(N>O>J)> |Gl (l)). Its objective is to choose jl to maximize
!l(y(bs(N>O>J)> |Gl (l))> J)
where J = J3l + jl. The ﬁrst-order condition for an interior maximum is
C!l
Cxl
gxl
gjl
+
C!l
CJ
= 0 (19)
This ﬁrst-order condition can also be expressed as
!lJ = !
l
y
μ
ys + y|
C|Gl
Cbs
¶
Cbs
CJ
¸
 !ly

y|
C|Gl
Cjl
¸
(20)
This condition shows that, in choosing the best reply jl to a givenJ3l, country
l should equate the marginal gain from having a larger total supply of the
public good, !lJ, with the marginal loss, !
l
y
gxl
gjl
> from a fall in utility derived
from private goods. The magnitude of !ly
gxl
gjl
depends on two terms:
(i) The ﬁrst term represents the terms-of-trade eect, i.e., the ﬁrst expres-
sion on the right-hand side of (20), which is in general non-zero, unless either
ys + y|
C|Gl
Ces = 0 (i.e., the country’s net import of good E is zero), or
Ces
CJ = 0
(i.e., the razor’s edge case where the right-hand side of (14) just happens to
be zero.)
(ii) The second term is the direct income loss, i.e., the second expression
on the right-hand side of (20), which is always positive.
The right-hand side of (20) may also be written as
!ly
gxl
gjl
= !ly

gxl
gbs CbsCJ + CxlCjl
¸
= (!ly)

PEl
h(bs)
μ
f(bs)lbsh(bs){
¶
+
f(bs)
h(bs)
¸
(21)
where
l 

 
bsf0(bs)
f(bs)
¸
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PEl 
h0
h
[uNl + zOl  fjl] [Nlu0 + Olz0  jlf0] (22)
We assume that given J3l, the ﬁrst-order condition (19) yields a unique
jl and that the second-order condition is satisﬁed.
Then the Nash equilibrium vector of contributions (j1> ===> jq) is the solu-
tion of the system of q ﬁrst-order conditions (19) for l = 1> ===> q=
It will be convenient to write the ﬁrst-order condition as
!lJ
!ly
=
f(bs)
h(bs)
½
1 +
PEl
h(bs)
μ
lbs{
¶¾
(23)
where the left-hand side is the marginal rate of subsitution of J for xl along
a constant-fecility curve, !l(xl> J) = constant. The right-hand side can be
interpreted as the marginal rate of transformation (taking into account the
response of equilibrium terms of trade to changes in public good contribu-
tions).
5 Non-neutrality result with respect to redis-
tribution
Consider a redistribution of capital among the q countries. Let gNl be a
small change in country l’s capital stock. Assume
X
l
gNl = 0. Under what
conditions will there be no change in the total provision J of public good
nor in the private-goods utility levels xl? That is, under what conditions can
one carry over the neutrality result of Warr-Kemp-Bergstrom-Blume-Varian
(WKBBV) to our world with endogenous terms of trade? If the WKBBV
result holds in our world, J will be unchanged, and the country for which
gNl A 0 will supply more public good (gjl A 0), but its private utility xl
will be unchanged. And, since both J and xl are unchanged, its felicity level
!l(xl> J) will also be unchanged.
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5.1 A General Result
Suppose the WKBBV neutrality result holds.Then xl and J are unchanged,
hence the value of the left-hand side of (23) is not aected by a redistribution
of capital. It follows that the right-hand side of (23) must be unaected. With
J andN unchanged, bs will be unchanged, by Lemma 2. Hence the right-hand
side of (23) is unaected if and only if lPEl @{ is unchanged, which is in turn
equivalent to the invariance of
lh0
h
[(Nl + gNl)u + zOl  (jl + gjl)f]l [(Nl + gNl)u0 + Olz0  (jl + gjl)f0]
This invariance obtains if and only if
lK = 0
where
K  [
h0
h
u  u0]gNl  [
h0
h
f f0]gjl (24)
On the other hand since xl = y(s> |Gl ), if both xl and s are unchanged,
then |Gl must be unchanged. Now, before the redistribution of capital, |Gl is
|Gl = uNl + zOl  f(s)jl
and after redistribution |Gl is
|Gl = u(Nl + gNl) + zOl  f(s)(jl + gjl)
Thus |Gl is unchanged if and only if
ugNl  f(s)gjl = 0
i.e.,
gjl =
u
f
gNl
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Substituting this equality into (24), we have
K  [(
h0
h
u  u0)
u
f
(
h0
h
f f0)]gNl
= [u(
h0
h
u
u

u0
u
) u(
h0
h
f
f

f0
f
)]gNl
= u[
f0
f

u0
u
]gNl
Considering f(s)  Fj(z(s)> u(s))> and making use of the fact that Fj(z> u)
is homogenous of degree one, we can write
f0
f
=
z
Fj
CFj
Cz
z0
z
+
u
Fj
CFj
Cu
u0
u
=
z
Fj
CFj
Cz
z0
z
+

1
z
Fj
CFj
Cz
¸
u0
u
thus
K =
uz
Fj
CFj
Cz
[
z0
z

u0
u
]gNl (25)
Now, since the sign of z0(s) is always opposite to the sign of u0(s) (that is,
in the absence of technical progress, it is not possible for both factor prices
to move in the same direction), we know that the right-hand side of (25) is
non-zero, unless CF
j
Cz = 0. It follows that is impossible to have K = 0, unless
labor is not used in the production of the public good.
Proposition 1: Assume labor is an input used in strictly positive amount
(possibly together with capital) in the production of the public good. Then
the WKBBV neutrality result does not hold in our model, except in the
extremely special case where the budget share of good E in the private goods
expenditure just happens to be equal to the elasticity of the unit cost of the
public good with respect to the price of good E, i.e., when

 
bsf0(bs)
f(bs)
¸
= 0 (26)
Remark: The intuition behind our non-neutrality result is as follows.
When a country l decides on the amount of public good jl it should contribute,
it takes into account two factors. First, at constant price, an increase in jl
by gjl will increase the total supply of public good J by gJ = gjl (Nash
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behavior), and reduce its disposable income (for private good consumption)
by f(s)gjl. Second, the change in jl , and hence in J (given the contributions
of other countries) will have a terms of trade eect (unless the budget share
of good E in the private goods expenditure equals the elasticity of the unit
cost of the public good with respect to the price of good E). More precisely,
suppose that, as a result of an exogenous redistribution of capital, country l
receives gNl units of capital, and knows that the sum total of redistribution
to other countries equals gNl. Suppose it knows that other countries change
their contribution to the public good by gJ3l = ugNl@f(bs). Should country
l increase its contribution by gjl = ugNl@f(bs)?Such an increase would imply
gNjl = dNgj = dN

ugNl
f(bs)
¸
where dN =
CFj
Cu
gOjl = dOgj = dO

ugNl
f(bs)
¸
where dO =
CFj
Cz
This in turn would imply that the change in capital and labor available for
private goods productions are
gKl = gNl  gNjl = gNl

1
udN
f(bs)
¸
= gNl

udN + zdO  udN
f(bs)
¸
gLl = gOjl = gNl

udO
f(bs)
¸
Thus, if dO A 0, we would have gKl A 0 and gLl ? 0. It follows (from
Rybczynski theorem) that tDl would decrease, and tEl would increase. This
would have a terms-of-trade eect, which must be taken into account.
5.2 Degenerate Cases
We now look at special cases in which the WKBBV neutrality results hold.
The ﬁrst case may be called the “small country case”. Recall that in the
general case, we have the terms of trade eect, which is the term
gxl
gbs CbsCjl = gxlgbs CbsCJ = P
E
l
h(bs)
μ
f(bs)lbsh(bs){
¶
(27)
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in equation (21). If a country is small, it will think that its changes in jl will
have no eect on the world equilibrium price of good E. That is, it behaves
as if Cbs@CJ = 0, i.e., as if { =4, i.e, as if it faces an inﬁnitely elastic supply
curve from the rest of the world. In this case, expression (23) becomes
!lJ
!ly
=
f(bs)
h(bs)
and thus J is unchanged (the sum J3l + jl is constant).
The second special case has been mentioned earlier. If labor is not an input
in the production of the public good, then countries that receive gNl A 0 will
use this additional input to produce additional units of public good, leaving
the private-sector allocation of capital and labor unchanged, and countries
for which gNl ? 0 will reduce its output of the public good accordingly,
again leaving the private-sector allocation of capital and labor unchanged.
(This argument relies on the assumption that gNl is small relative to the pre-
redistribution amount of capital used in the production of the public good jl.)
Only in the case where labor is an input in the production of the public good
will the terms of trade consideration comes into play, because countries know
that once the private-sector allocation of capital and labor is changed, the
Rybczinsky eect implies, at any given price ratio, changes in relative supply
of the two private goods.
Proposition 2: If all countries are small, or if labor is not an input in the
production of the public good, then the WKBBV neutrality theorem holds.
5.3 Other Considerations
We now turn to two additional considerations: tradeable public good, and cor-
ner solutions. First, let us examine the role of the assumption that the public
good is not internationally traded (in exchange for private goods). Under the
assumptions of our model, under diversiﬁcation of private good production in
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each country, factor prices are equalised, and hence the unit costs of produc-
tion of the public good are the same in all countries. Under these conditions,
one might think that there are no reasons why the public good would be inter-
nationally traded even if such trade is feasible. But upon reﬂection, recalling
the Rybczinsky eect mentioned in the previous sub-sections, a government
might have an incentive to outsource (to a foreign country) the production
of its public good contribution. This can cause the foreign country to change
its private-sector allocation of capital and labor, and hence this can impact
the terms of trade. In other words, in a two-country world, if taris and
quotas are not permitted, a country can still inﬂuence the terms of trade by
outsourcing to the foreign country its public good contribution.
The second issue we want to discuss is the case of corner solutions. This
matter is too complicated to deal with in full generality. We will therefore
restrict attention to one result. In the BBV model, if one player, say player
1, does not contribute to the public good, then a redistribution of endowment
away from that player will increase the total supply of public good. Would
this result also hold in our model, where countries can inﬂuence the terms of
trade?
For simplicity, let us consider a special case. Suppose for all countries,
!l(x>J) = x+ #l(J)
Then the ﬁrst order condition for the maximization problem of the government
l is (taking into account the constraint jl  0),
#lJ(J)

PEl
h(bs)
μ
f(bs)lbsh(bs){
¶
+
f(bs)
h(bs)
¸
+ l = 0
where
l  0, jl  0, ljl = 0, l = 1> 2> 3> ===> q=
Suppose country 1 is a non-contributor, while all other countries (m =
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2> 3> ===> q) are contributors. Then
#mJ(J)
"
PEm
h(bs)
μ
f(bs)lbsh(bs){
¶
+
f(bs)
h(bs)
#
= 0, m 6= 1. (28)
Consider a redistribution of capital away from country 1. To ﬁx ideas, suppose
that originally l@{ A 0 and PE1 A 0. At given bs, a redistribution with
gN1 ? 0 will make country 1 worse o, and PE1 falls. Suppose the total
supply of public good J remains unchanged. Then bs will be unchanged. So
PE is unchanged, implying that
qX
m=2
gPEm = gP1 A 0
Summing (28) over m = 2> 3> ===> q, we get, before the redistribution,
qX
m=2
#mJ(J) =

PE1
h(bs)
μ
f(bs)lbsh(bs){
¶
+
f(bs)
h(bs)
¸
(29)
and, after the redistribution,
qX
m=2
#mJ(J) =

(PE1 + gPE1 )
h(bs)
μ
f(bs)lbsh(bs){
¶
+
f(bs)
h(bs)
¸
(30)
Equations (29) and (30) are mutually inconsistent. It follows that J must
change after the redistribution.
Proposition 3: In general, a redistribution away from a non-contributing
country will lead to a change in total contribution of the public good.
5.4 Additional Results
We can calculate esf
0(es)
f(es) in (26). The result recorded in the following Lemma.
Lemma 5: Let m denote the labour share in the unit cost of good m
(where m = D>E> j). Then
bsf0(bs)
f(bs) = j(1 D) (1 j)DE  D (31)
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Proof: See the Appendix.
The following results are corollary of Lemma 5:
Corollary 1: bsf0(bs)@f(bs) is positive if the numeraire good is either the
most labor intensive good, or the least labor intensive good.
Corollary 2: A necessary condition for bsf0(bs)@f(bs) to be equal to  is
that j is intermediate between D and E.
Proof: bsf0(bs)
f(bs)   = (E  D)©j  £E + (1 )D¤ª
The term inside the curly brackets can be equal to zero only if j is a weighted
average of D and E.
Corollary 3: Suppose j is greater than both d and E . Then bsf0(bs)@f(bs) A
 if and only if E A D.
6 Concluding Remarks
We have shown that the famous neutrality result of Warr, Kemp, Bergstrom,
Blume and Varian depends crucially on the assumption that agents do not
take into account the eect of their public good contribution decisions on
the relative price(s) of the private goods. Thus, the scope of applicability of
their result is not as large as one might at ﬁsrt think. Our non-neutrality
results hold even if all countries are identical in technology, preferences, and
endowments.
Our framework of analysis can be extended to the case where public goods
are not “pure”. In such an extended framework, the relevant question would
no longer be the neutrality with respect to redistribution, but rather how pub-
lic good decisions impact on the trade patterns and welfare levels of individual
countries, as well as world welfare. This is part of our research agenda.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 5
Part 1: The eect of an increase in the relative price of good E
on the wage and rental rates (expressed in terms of good D)
From the price-equals-cost equations,
s = FE(z> u)
1 = FD(z> u)
Dierentiating these two equations with respect to s
gs = FEz gz + F
E
u gu
0 = FDzgz + F
D
u gu
Rearranging terms (noting that FE = s and FD = 1) to get
1 =
μ
zFEz
FE
¶ 
s
z
gz
gs
¸
+
μ
uFEu
FE
¶ 
s
u
gu
gs
¸
(32)
0 =
μ
zFDz
FD
¶ 
1
z
gz
gs
¸
+
μ
uFDu
FD
¶ 
1
u
gu
gs
¸
(33)
Multiply both sides of equation (33) by s to get
0 =
μ
zFDz
FD
¶ 
s
z
gz
gs
¸
+
μ
uFDu
FD
¶ 
s
u
gu
gs
¸
(34)
Deﬁne the elasticity of wage and elasticity of rental with respect to s by
%zs =

s
z
gz
gs
¸
and %us =

s
u
gu
gs
¸
Deﬁne the labour share in good m by m
E =
μ
zFEz
FE
¶
and D =
μ
zFDz
FD
¶
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Using these shares and elasticities in equations (32) and (34) we get the matrix
equation 
E 1 E
D 1 D
¸ 
%$s
%us
¸
=

1
0
¸
Solving, we get
%zs =
1 D
E  D
%zs =
D
E  D
Thus, if good E is more labour intensive than good D, then an increase in
the price of good E will increase the real wage in terms of good D (and
gz@z A gs@s-the magniﬁcation eect- so the real wage in terms of good E
also rises), and reduce the rental rate, in terms of both goods.
Part 2: solving for f0(s)s@f(s)
Recall that
f(s)  Fj(z(s)> u(s))
Thus
f0(s) = Fjz
gz
gs
+ Fju
gu
gs
=
Fj
s
μ
zFjz
Fj
¶ 
s
z
gz
gs
¸
+
Fj
s
μ
uFju
Fj
¶ 
s
u
gu
gs
¸
=
Fj
s
£
j%zs + (1 
j)%us
¤
=
Fj
s

j
μ
1 D
E  D
¶
+ (1 j)
μ
D
E  D
¶¸
Therefore
sf0(s)
f(s)
= j
μ
1 D
E  D
¶
+ (1 j)
μ
D
E  D
¶
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